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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the Anny's structure, communications architecture, 
communications system and equipment, and communications-electronics role in the 
Joint Task Force. It provides readers an understanding of current Army systems and 
frames requirements for their evolution. The intended audience is other than Army. 
Accordingly Army structural and communications parochialisms are described. 
After establishing a baseline of Anny structure and communications, a 
discussion of the Unified Command command and control architecture ensues. The 
Joint Task Force and separate Service communications responsibilities are then 
delineated. Discussions on joint communications interoperability and existing trends 
are included. Trends of note are the increase in reliance on satellite 
communications and bandwidth requirements in support of bulk data transmission. 
The running themes throughout this thesis are doctrine and technology. These 
are two of the primary drivers for future communications architectures. Thus there 
is a focus on the current status of joint doctrine and existing communications 
equipment in the Anny inventory. To highlight future Anny systems requirements, 
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The United States is in the midst of historic changes. The 
fall of the Soviet Union has driven a re-evaluation of our 
National Military Strategy. A strategic shift from global and 
theater warfare to crisis operations is underway. Underlying 
this is the ongoing reduction in Service force levels. Austere 
forces, capable of responding to a wide spectrum of 
contingency operations, must inherently be rapidly deployable 
and lethal. Wars of attrition are no longer feasible. Rapidly 
deployable forces capable of a variety of operations equate to 
joint force compos~tion. The need for effective joint 
operations has led to a renewed emphasis on the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) . 
Joint Operations have been ongoing since the Revolutionary 
War. 1 Inter-service communications interoperability and 
coordination in support of Joint Operations have been, and are 
currently, effected with a "band-aid and bailing wire" 
approach. 2 This haphazard technique is derived from intra-
service communications interoperability concerns, inter-
1 For a discussion on the evolution of joint mechanisms 
for force projection see Cushman, June 1991, pp. 27-48. 
2 Work-a-rounds are discussed in Cushman, June 1991, 
p.3, p.4 and JCS Manual 525-10, 1988, pp. 1-3, 1-7. 
1 
service communication equipment incompatibilities and a lack 
of succinct Joint Doctrine. In the past these issues were 
overcome with liaison teams. Reducing force levels and budgets 
will not support the manpower and assets required for a 
liaison team intensive structure. (Information Mission Area 
White Paper, 15 October 1993, p. 1) 
Service specific command, control and communications (C3) 
systems are designed to support command and control ( C2) 
architectures that have developed under the auspices of the 
Cold War threat. Bach Service was focused on their roles in an 
anticipated global war. Intra-service communications developed 
accordingly. This has led to a divergence in inter-service 
communications systems. 
Technological advances and the fall of the Soviet Union 
have antiquated many Service C3 concepts. The challenge to the 
services is to develop C3 systems and C2 architectures that 
effectively exploit technological advances and are 
interoperable. The JTF's Joint Communications Network (JCN) 
must be capable of providing a timely, seamless and 
synergistic view of the battlefield. 
In support of the JTF JCN the Services must implement 
strategies to bring about a convergence of communications 
equipment interoperability. Effective C2 architectures and C3 




To be an efficient manager and user of a system one must 
know its capabilities and limitations. In support of this 
endeavor the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers 
and Intelligence (JC4I) Systems curriculum provides students 
a Joint view of C4I. The purpose of this thesis is to provide 
an in-depth examination of the Army's structure, C2 
architecture, communications equipment and communications 
responsibilities in the JTF. Additionally this thesis 
provides insights into the future Army C2 architecture, C3 
systems and its role in joint operations. 
C. ORGARIZA'l':tON 
This document is organized into five chapters. The first 
chapter provides the general framework and purpose of the 
thesis. A scenario is also included. The intent of the 
scenario is to provide a focal point for examining a possible 
future C3 system. The second chapter provides the reader a 
baseline understanding of the Army's tactical C3 system and C2 
architecture. The architectural information is taken directly 
from Army Field Manuals. The discussion in this chapter 
includes a perspective on the ongoing evolution of the Army's 
C2 architecture. The third chapter is a description of the 
Army's tactical communications system (i.e., Mobile Subscriber 
Equipment (MSE)). This chapter provides an understanding of 
3 
MSE employment and an in-depth description c communication 
assemblage capabilities. Equipment descriptions were extracted 
from contractor provided materials. Chapter IV provides the 
template for Unified Command and JTF C2 architecture under 
which the Army must operate. Included in the chapter is an 
itemization of Service communications responsibilities and 
communications interoperability performance. The bulk of 
information from this chapter was derived from Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm lessons learned and Joint Publications. 
Chapter V provides a recapitulation of Army communications 
interoperability and illuminates requirements of the future C3 
system. This chapter presents the conclusion of the scenario 
presented in the first chapter. 
D. SCDAAIO 
The following is a scenario to illustrate future C3 
requirements and a possible solution thereto. It is focused on 
the initial operations conducted by the Commander of Land 
Forces (in this case, Army). 
Downsized forces and a shrinking defense budget has 
resulted in an increased reliance on technology to provide the 
force multiplier. 3 Increased world tensions have driven the 
National Military Strategy to shift focus from a global and 
3 Paraphrased from a quote by General Colin L. Powell 
found in the Information Mission Area White Paper, 15 
October 1993, p. 1). 
4 
theater war scenario to a multi-crisis scenario in various 
theaters. In support of the changing world scenario the Army 
has reorganized from divisions into Strike Teams {ST) . The 
Strike Teams are division-sized and designed to exploit 
technical assets over widely dispersed areas. The intent is to 
provide maximum kill power from weapons platforms available. 
To reduce force exposure, over-the-horizon target 
identification, tracking, acquisition and engagement has 
become the combat engagement norm. The Strike Teams rely 
heavily on intelligence of en~ location and composition for 
the targeting of advanced and limited munitions. Accordingly, 
look-shoot-look is enforced. 
1. The WarDing Order 
a. S.:Ltuat.:Lcm 
Southeast Asia. Western Calmorn has claimed 
historical sovereignty over Eastern Calmorn. An invasion of 
Eastern Calmorn is eminent (within 72 hours). Eastern Calmorn 
is of strategic importance to the u.s. for its production of 
Situponide, a critical element in the production of composite 
materials. 
Enemy. Western Calmorn's Army consists of three 
modern equipped divisions (two armored (AR) and one Infantry 
(IN)). One AR division is currently massed on the border with 
Eastern Calmorn. The other AR division is maintaining garrison 
positions along its supplemental landlocked borders. The 
5 
Infantry Division is garrisoned within the Western Calmorn 
capital to insure civilian acquiescence. 
Friendly. The 12th Strike Team (ST), currently 
located at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, is to deploy its three 
brigades (aviation, armor, infantry) to Eastern Calmorn. Air 
Force and Naval assets are available for support. Eastern 
Calmorn's forces are limited to lightly armed border forces 
and antiquated reconnaissance aircraft. Equipment for the AR 
Brigade is prepositioned in the Southwest Pacific. Transit 
time to Eastern Calmorn by Roll-on-Roll-off (RORO) seaborne 
vessels is 24 hours. 
b. 111ss1ou 
The 12th ST is to prepare to conduct offensive 
operations to repulse and destroy all military elements of 
Western Calmorn which penetrate the border of Eastern calmorn. 
Sovereignty of Eastern Calmorn must be maintained. Specific 
tasks include restoration of border, security of the 
Situponide mines and security of air and sea ports as 
required. 
c. Bxecut1ou 
Eastern Calmorn' a forces will provide initial 
screening and border penetration alert. u.S. AWACS, JSTARS and 
National Technical Means will be active and available for 
support in the region prior to Army Strike Team arrival . Speed 
is of the essence. Preparatory fires (at border penetration) 
6 
will be conducted by Naval Gun Fire. Combat Air Support is 
available from the Task Force Navy, Marine, and Air Force 
components. The 12th ST Aviation brigade is to engage and 
destroy the enemy far forward. Security can be provided for 12 
hours (nominal) to allow linkup with RORO transported 
equipment. The 12th STAR brigade must be prepared to continue 
the attack, conduct mop-up, and re-establish the border. The 
12th IN brigade will conduct airborne operations to secure 
Pokimp International and Gutae Air Ports, and the Situponide 
mines. 
d. Service SUpport (Not Applicable) 
e. Con-end aad SigzJal 
Signal. All call signs and frequencies are in 
effect per Joint Standard Operating Procedures (JSOP). Call 
signs and frequencies are available on the Revised Battlefield 
Electronic Communications-Electronics Operation Instructions 
(CBOI) System (RBBCS) (an automated CBOI) • 
Command. JSOP's are in effect. 
2. CQ ender'a Thoughta 
The Strike Force commander has been identified as the 
Commander Land Forces (COMLANFOR). Because speed is of the 
essence the commander feels an immediate surgical strike from 
his aviation brigade will effectively halt the enemy advance. 
The key to his plan is knowing the enemy's exact composition 
and location. The commander envisions his phased employment as 
7 
1) air insertion of the infantry brigade to secure airports to 
support Army aviation operations, 2) the aviation brigade will 
fly to secured airports (air refueling en route), 3) the armor 
brigade will fly in to East Calmorn and effect link up with 
RORO transported equipment. Foremost in the commander's mind 
is acquisition of the enemy's forces. Time may not permit 
employment of the armored brigade. He must minimize exposure 
of his engaged forces and inflict maximum damage to the en~. 
This inherently dictates over-the-horizon engagements or, at 
a minimum, engagement at the outer envelope of the enemy's fan 
of fire. Target identification and selection will have to be 
done •on the fly.• The mission weighs heavy on his mind as he 
boards his newly fielded Army Tactical Command and Control 
Airborne Platform (ATC2AP) . 
8 
II. U AIQIY OVDVID 
A. 0. S • ARIIY TAC'l'ICAL S'J'Jl'OC'l'UJla 
The fundamental objective of our National Milit".ry 
Strategy is to deter aggression. U.S. forces must be able to 
respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win. 
Forces that the Army can deploy rapidly in support of National 
Military Strategy are corps size and below. (National Military 
Strategy of the United States, 1992, pp. 6-7) 
Tactics is defined as "the science and art of maneuvering 
forces in combat" and strategy as "the science and art of 
military command employed with the objective of meeting the 
enemy under conditions advantageous to one's own force." 4 A 
corps is the largest entity which can be maneuvered in combat. 
Ergo Corps sized units and below are considered the tactical 
level of the Army. Although a Corps can be employed in a 
stratagem, strategic deployment is most often conducted at the 
Army level. The remainder of this section will focus 
accordingly. 
1. BJ:aDChea of the Anly 
There are 20 branches in the Army. The branches are 
classified in one of three categories. The categories are 
Combat (C), Combat Support (CS), and Combat Service Support 
4 Merriam-Webster, July 1978, p. 695, p.676. 
9 
(CSS) . Branches that maneuver against the enemy are in the 
combat category. Units in direct support of combat units are 
combat support. Combat service support is composed of logistic 
and general support branches. Branch by category is indicated 
in Table I. 
Table I. BRANCH BY CATEGORY 
Combat 












2. Bcbalon Deacription 










A quick rule of thumb in rem~mbering the basic 
structure of the Army is "three and one.• At each level there 
are three maneuver or "line" units and one support unit. 
5 Reserve component only. 
10 
-"'-"'-'--•-------·-··-~----~~---------------------------------------......1 
Example: a battalion has three line companies and one 
headquarters (HQ) company. This rule of thumb is not a panacea 
for understanding the in-depth composition of all echelons. 
But it is a bench mark for the major subordinate units within 
a command. Although there are variations between unit types 
the fundamental concept remains sound. In descending order the 
echelons of the U.S. Army structure are army, corps, 
division/group, 6 brigade/regiment, 7 battalion/squadron, 8 
company/troop/battery, 9 platoon, squad, and section. The 
following is a brief description of the levels from corps 
through company. 
The major maneuver units within a corps are 
divisions. Corps may be assigned divisions of any type (see 
Subsection b. below) as required by the theater and the 
mission. A corps normally has two to five divisions of any 
type and combination. Historically, during peacetime, corps 
have had three divisions. (FM 100-15, 1989, p. 2-3) 
6 Both are equivalent in size. Group is normally 
associated with a support organization. 
7 A regiment is equivalent to a separate brigade. 
Regiment is associated with the cavalry. 
8 Both are equivalent in size. Aviation and cavalry 
battalions are called squadrons. 
9 All are equivalent. Troop is used by the cavalry. 
Battery is used by FA and ADA. 
11 
A corps possesses support commands and are 
assigned combat and combat support organizations based on 
their needs for a specific operation. Armored Cavalry 
Regiments (ACR), field artillery brigades, engineer brigades, 
air defense brigades, and aviation brigades are the non-
divisional units commonly available to the corps. Separate 
infantry or armored brigades may also be assigned to corps. 
Combat support organizations present in the corps are signal 
brigades, military intelligence brigades, military police 
brigades, civil affairs brigades, chemical brigades, and 
psychological operations battalions. Other Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) may support corps combat operations as required, 
particularly when the corps is conducting an independent 
operation. The combat service support organizations of the 
c~rps are the personnel group, the finance group, and the 
Corps Support Command (COSCOM). Figure 1 depicts a typical 
corps organization. 10 (FM 100-15, 1989, p.1-0) 
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Pigure 1. Typical Corps Organization 
b. D1v1•1ou 
The major maneuver units of a division are 
brigades. Normally a division has three ground maneuver 
brigades and one aviation (rotor} brigade. 
Divisions are fixed combined arms organizations 
capable of performing any tactical mission and are largely 
self-sustaining. They are the basic units of maneuver at the 
tactical level and perform major tactical operations for the 
corps. (FM 100-15, 1989, p.2-3} 
Additional combat units of a division are ADA 
battalion, engineer battalion, and FA brigade11 • Signal 
battalion, MI battalion, MP battalion, and a Chemical Company 
are the usual combat support organizations present in a 
division. The major combat service support organizations are 
11 Called Division Artillery (DIVARTY), has three 
subordinate FA battalions. 
13 
a personnel services element and the Division Support Command 
(DISCOM) 12 • 
Division types presently in the U.S. force 
structure are infantry, light infantry, armored, mechanized 
infantry, airborne and air assault. Following is a summa~' of 
division type capabilities. (FM 100-15, 1989, p.2-3) 
(1) Infant~ Division. The infantry division is 
predominately a dismounted force, capable of operations across 
the entire spectrum of conflict. The division possesses 
organic light (non-armored, i.e., High Mobility Multi-Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWV), two and a half ton trucks, five ton trucks, 
etc.) transportation assets. It is best suited for terrain and 
environmental conditions that limit the operations of a heavy 
force. Urban and jungle areas are examples of terrain 
appropriate for dismounted "straight-leg" infantry. (FM 100-
15, 1989, p. 2-3) 
(2) Light Infant~ Division. The light infantry 
division is designed for rapid deployment to enable them to 
arrive in a crisis area before a conflict begins. They are 
capable of operating for 48 hours without resupply. These are 
offensive oriented units well adept at operating in low 
intensity scenarios. (FM 100-15, 1989, pp. 2-3,2-4) 
12 There are three subordinate battalions to DISCOM. 
These are called Forward Support Battalions (FSB's). 
14 
(3) Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions. 
The armored and mechanized divisions are mobile, ground 
gaining forces with significant armor protected firepower 
(tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV's), Armored Personnel 
Carriers (APC' s) , etc.) . They are referred to as heavy 
divisions and are what the layman would consider a typical 
Army division. These divisions operate most effectively in 
terrain where they can move quickly and engage the enemy using 
long range, direct fire weapons. Their ability to deploy 
rapidly is limited and are best for developed theaters. 13 
These divisions are not pure (i.e., their maneuver units are 
not entirely armor or mechanized infantry) . An armored 
division has six armor battalions and four mechanized infantry 
battalions. A mechanized infantry division has five armored 
battalions and five mechanized infantry battalion ..... See Figure 
2 for a typical heavy division organization. 14 (FM 24-1, 
1985, p. 1-6) 
13 FM 100-15, 1989 I p. 2-4. 
14 See Appendix B for symbology. (FM 101-5-1, October 
1985) 
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Pigure 2. Typical Heavy Division Organization 
(4) Airborne Division. The airborne division is 
designed for rapid deployment. It is organized, equipped, and 
trained to conduct parachute assaults. They are dependent on 
the Air Force for airlift, Close Air Support (CAS), and 
resupply. This division type is well suited for power 
projection in contingency operations and in situations calling 
for early buildup of combat forces. This employment strategy 
was observed during Operation Desert Shield. The airborne 
division provides limited combat power early and will require 
reinforcement to sustain and continue operations. (FM 100-15, 
1989, p.2-4) 
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(5) Air assault Division. The air assault 
division is designed to conduct rapid tempo tactical 
operations over extended ranges. Organic rotor airlift and 
attack craft enable the division to project significant combat 
power. The agility of this division to concentrate, disperse, 
and redeploy its forces make it a highly responsive mobile 
reserve. (FM 100-15, 1989, p. 2-4) 
c. Brigade 
The mission of the brigade is to close with and 
destroy enemy forces using its mobility, firepower, and shock 
effect. Brigades do not act independently but as part of a 
division or corps. There are two types of brigades. They are 
divisional and separate. (FM 71-3, 1988, pp. 1-1, 1-5) 
(1) Divisional Brigade. Divisional brigades are 
subordinate to a division. The only permanently assigned unit 
to a brigade is its Headquarters and Headquarters Company 
(HHC). The HHC provides direction and C2 over units assigned 
to, attached to, or supporting the brigade. The division 
commander attaches maneuver battalions to the brigade based on 
the situation and mission requirements. A brigade can control 
two to five battalions. Normally during peacetime, a brigade 
maintains a habitual relationship over three battalions. 
During combined operations (the norm) additional units are 
tasked to provide Direct Support (DS). Brigade DS is 
ordinarily comprised of a FA battalion, an ADA battery, an 
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engineer company, a signal platoon, a MP platoon, combat 
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) elements, a Tactical 
Air Control Party (TACP), and a DISCOM Forward Support 
Battalion (FSB) . A brigade with all attached and DS units is 
commonly referred to as a Brigade Task Force. (FM 71-3, 1988, 
pp.1-5,1-6) 
(2) Separate Brigade. Separate Brigades conduct 
operations under corps command and are organized to provide 
their own support. They are a stand alone combined arms force 
with organic assets. These assets include: HHC, MP, chemical, 
signal and ADA elements; maneuver battalions; armored cavalry 
troop; FA battalion; engineer company; MI company; and FSB. 
Additional combat, CS, and CSS units may be attached. A 
separate brigade may be attached to a division but is usually 
controlled by corps. (FM 71-3, 1988, pp. 1-6) 
d. Battal.tcm 
The battalion baseline is three line companies and 
one headquarters (HQ) company. A pure battalion (infantry or 
armor) is composed of t~:~ee identical line companies and the 
HQ company. Battalions, -ike brigades, can be task organized 
to improve their capabilities. Task organization is directed 
by the brigade commander based on his/her estimate of the 
situation. A task organized battalion is called a Battalion 
Task Force. (FM 71-1, p. 1-2) 
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The company baseline consists of three line 
platoons and a company HQ (platoon sized) . In a pure 
battalion, the battalion commander may direct cross-attachment 
of platoons/sections depending on mission requirements 
(usually to exploit or reinforce). Companies in a Battalion 
Task Force can be task organized into Company Teams. The task 
force commander may cross-attach platoons to form one or more 
Company Teams. Compa 7cy Team organization is based on his/her 
estimate of the situation. (FM 71-1, p. 1-6) 
B. .u.MY CO*UHICATIOIIS .U.CBI'l'BCTURB, AR OVDVIBW 
The Army Communications Architecture is an ongoing and 
evolving entity. Changing tactics and technological 
advancements are driving this evolution. For millennia 
tactical forces were concentrated enough to be directed either 
visually or vocally by their commanders. Dispersion of forces 
has increased exponentially with the increase in range and 
lethality of weapons and the availability of information 
technologies. Tactics (i.e., doctrine) to combat new weapons 
systems have altered accordingly. The challenge to 
communications engineers is to develop architectures and 




Army doctrine is 
Air-Land Battle 
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called Air-Land Battle 
doctrinal view of the 
battlefield is nonlinear. A commander must be able to see deep 
into the enemy's rear and expeditiously employ combined forces 
to destroy him. The key to a commander's success is his 
ability to integrate and coordinate the combined force. The 
current Army communications architecture is designed to 
support the commander in prosecuting Air-Land Battle 
operations. (FM 24-1, pp. 1-1,1-2) 
1. Batt1efie14 JUDcticmal Area• (BI'A'•> 
To support the Air-Land Battle doctrine the Army has 
identified five groups or functional areas of users that must 
be supported by the communications architecture. These five 
groups are called Battlefield Functional Areas (BFA'S). The 
BFA' s are Maneuver15 , Combat Service support (CSS) 16 , Fire 
Support (FS) 17 , Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and 
Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare ( IEW) 18 • 
2 . CCI 'Dicaticm. Tz'ia4 
To support the BFA'S the Army communications 
architecture appears as a triad. The triad consists of the 
Area Common User System (ACUS), the Army Data Distribution 
System (ADDS), and the Combat Network Radio (CNR) . See Figure 
3. 
15 Encompasses maneuver units (AR, INF, AV) . 
16 Logistics community. 
17 Field artillery community. 
18 Military Intelligence community. 
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Pigure 3 . The Triad 
a. Area Qwa:an User C1rcu1t: (ACUS) 
The ACUS is analogous to a tactical, military Bell 
Telephone System. Under the umbrella of ACUS are the systems 
and equipment that establish the backbone switching and 
telephone system. The roots of ACUS are traceable to the 
simple land line telephone systems of World War I. The concept 
of the ACUS has remained constant. The technologies supporting 
it continue to evolve to keep pace with commanders on a 
spatial expanded and temporal contracted battlefield. The Army 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSB) is the current ACUS. 
b. Anly .Data D1st:ribut:1on Syst:em (ADDS) 
ADDS came into being with the advent of digital 
data. The pace of battle and reduced force levels have made 
timely information gathering and dissemination critical. To 
support near real-time sensor and targeting data distribution 
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the A~ has developed, and continues to improve, Battlefield 
Automated Systems (BASs, also called Battlefield Operating 
Systems, BOSs). Examples of BASs are: Maneuver Control System 
(MCS), Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS), Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the All Source 
Analysis System (ASAS). Interface of the BASs is a challenge. 
The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) is a 
system currently undergoing trials as the standardized 
workhorse for BAS data transfer. (Sciomacco) 
c. Ca.bat Net Jtad1o (CD) 
CNR is the tactical voice (FM or AM) network. The 
primary function of CNR is to provide the maneuver commander 
real time command and control (C2) of his forces. As with all 
radiating systems, Direction Finding (OF) and jamming are the 
CNR' s weaknesses. To overcome these shortfalls two trends have 
emerged. First, tactical voice radio emissions at the brigade 
level and above are being reduced. Brigade/Division Tactical 
Operation Centers (TOes) are relatively static and can 
therefore rely more on fixed communications (i.e., ACUS and 
ADDS) for C2I. Units below the brigade level habitually 
displace often. Movement, Emission Control (EMCON), and proper 
Radio Telephone Operating (RTO) procedures reduce the 
effectiveness of eneM¥ intercept, jamming, and OF. Secondly, 
technological advancements (frequency hopping, spread 
spectrum, etc.) have improved radio performance in combating 
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enemy Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) . To capitalize on 
these advancements, the Army has fielded the Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) as a replacement 
for existing UHF radio sets. 
3. •si~ star• 
The cumulative representation of the communications 
triad in concert with the Battlefield Functional Areas (BFAs) 
is called the • Sigma Star." Sigma is used in deferen.:e to the 
mathematical use of the greek letter S to indicate sums. The 
Sigma Star is depicted in Figure 4 . 
Wigure ~. Sigma Star 
... 
.... ,., 
L ' ( 
It is seen that the three systems of the 
communications architecture overlap each other and the links 
between BFAs. The Sigma Star exists at all echelons with 
combined forces. This is the heart of Army communications. 
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In this configuration the BFAs share data over one or 
more of the triad links. In the past, CNR has been the 
communications link workhorse. Sh~red information creates a 
synergistic effect that allows a commander to make sound 
decisions. Sigma Star functionality provides an avenue for 
information synergism which is the key to success on the Air-
Land Bai:tlefield. 
4. AZ'II,V ttac:tic:al Co.taDd aD4 Control Syat- (ATCCS) 
The employment and integration of the Sigma Star from 
corps through brigade is called the Army Tactical Command and 
Control System (ATCCS) (see Figure 5}. 
(BPA) 
Wigure 5. Army Tactical Command and Control System 
Integration of the Sigma Stars occur through either 
MSE gateways or like BFA's operating systems. Similar systems 
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and procedures exist within like BFAs at each echelon within 
the ATCCS. Passing information vertically between like BFAs is 
easy however, it creates the stove pipe effect. In the past 
horizontal communications were achieved using voice radios. 
This approach is too slow and unreliable. The hurdle for the 
Army is fusing and disseminating information between BFA's. 
5. Aray Col UDicationa Architecture in 'l'rftDaition. 
Reduction of forces and diversified missions are 
compelling the services to increase unit lethality. A unit 
must acquire, identify, track, engage, and destroy an enemy 
efficiently. Gone are the days of deploying field armies that 
prosecute protracted campaigns. Service doctrine is maturing 
accordingly. As stated in the National Milita~ Strategy of 
the United States (1992), an essential element of our national 
military strategy is the ability to overwhelm our adversaries 
and terminate conflicts swiftly (p. 10). The existing army 
communications architecture is technologically constrained and 
can not effectively fuse and rapidly disseminate data in 
support of the National Milit·ary Strategy . 19 Ergo, the 
communications architecture is in transition. 
One new vision for the Army's C4 programs is called 
the "Enterprise Strategy". This strategy is the brainchild of 
Lieutenant General Peter A. Kind, USA, Director of Information 
Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers 
19 EPLRS LRIP, Feb 1993, p. 1-0. 
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(C4), Office of the Secretary of the Army. LTG Kind describes 
the •Enterprise Strategyu as: 
... an architecture that will support force projection, 
from CONUS [continental U.S.) through the tactical area 
[in a regional theater), with no boundaries. Enterprise is 
an overall road map for the modernization of the whole 
information management area ... it takes the equipment we 
have now and projects what we're going to have coming in 
each area, what our goals are, and how we want to 
implement them. It encompasses the whole range of 
information management services and includes CONUS through 
the tactical forces. So it says that we provide whatever 
service the commander or his staff needs anywhere on the 
globe and get information to wherever it is needed. 
(Goodman, June 1993, p. 46) 
The Enterprise Strategy envisions one architecture 
that goes well beyond the individual tactical systems (ACUS, 
ADDS, CNR) . 20 The base functions of the triad will continue 
to be required on the battlefield. There will always be a need 
for a communications backbone, combat voice, and data 
distribution. However, the functions can no longer be viewed 
as separate entities with minimum overlap (see Figure 3). The 
functions must operate as one synergistic, seamless system. 
The communications architecture from the triad through the 
ATCCS must function as a veritable tactical "information 
highway. • 
Another vision (by Hughes Aircraft Company) of the 
future architecture is seen in Figure 6. This architecture 
20 Browning, E-MAIL, 14 March 1994. 
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objective, like the Enterprise Strategy, is to integrate 
information. Unlike the Enterprise Strategy, it is focused on 
the tactical level only. (BPLRS LRIP, Feb 1993, p. 1-3) 
Pigure 6. Triad in Transition 
This vision proposes three levels. These levels are 
Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN) and a Range 
Extension (RNG EXT) . The LAN is designed to support a division 
sized element, WAN for corps, and the RNG EXT for gateways to 
echelons above corps (BAC) and distanced units. 
While these two proposed visions are similar in 
nature, the Enterprise Strategy is a depth and breadth 
solution to the future Army Communications Architecture which 
is receiving support. The executive or top-level design of the 
"Enterprise Strategy" has been published. The implementation 
27 
plan has not. 21 Exactly what the Army's new communications 
architecture will be remains to be seen. It is apparent that 
the tenet of this architecture is that it be single and 
seamless. Systems that do not meet, or cannot be adapted to 
this architecture will not be supported in the top level 
review process. (Browning, E-Mail, 14 March 1994) 
21 Goodman, Jun 1993, p. 46. 
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III. UIIY BACDONB COIIIIUNICATIOHS 
The Army backbone communications system is established 
using Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) . MSE is a mobile, 
militarized, long-distance communications system designed to 
keep pace on the Air-Land Battlefield. The previous backbone 
system was fielded under the auspices of the Tri-Service 
Tactical Communication (TRI-TAC) concept. 
TRI-TAC was the first generation of communications 
equipment designed to support modern combat forces. As stated 
in DOD Directive 5148.7, the program objective was "to lay 
the foundation for maximum effectiveness and economy in the 
future development, programming, and acquisition of joint 
communications equipment for tactical forces of the U.S. 
Services." TRI-TAC met this objective and dovetailed with the 
Army's shift in doctrine from the Active Defense to Air-Land 
Battle. TRI-TAC was a personnel, equipment, and cable 
intensive system. Although TRI-TAC was too cumbersome for 
corps level and below, its switches remain the workhorse for 
EAC, joint, and coalition interface. In its infancy, the 
system was Pulse Code Modulated (PCM) supporting analog 
communications. It was a preliminary step in supporting modern 
combat communications requirements however, the system's size, 
weight and marginal circuit quality doomed it to failure as 
the tactical level system. (Bingham, pp. 1-20) 
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Acquisition of a modern communications system that could 
keep pace on the battlefield was paramount to the Army. The 
study of equipment to support a mobile subscriber began as 
early as June 1955. The project however was not pursued in 
earnest until the late 1970's. A special task force to 
shepherd MSE into development was established on 14 December 
1977. MSB as is manifest in the inventory today was developed 
by General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) in conjunction with 
the French Reseau Integre de Transmissions Automatique (RITA). 
The incorporation of technological advancements reduced the 
size and weight of equipment, and automated numerous 
functions. This mobile communications system with reduced 
personnel requirements supports the tactical commander. 
(Bingham, pp. 1-23) 
A. KOBILB SUBSCRIBD SYS'IWI OVDVIBII 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment is a secure, flexible, area 
grid communications system that services both mobile and wire 
subscribers. Designed for the corps and below it is a digital 
system that is capable of transmitting both voice and data. It 
has gateway interfaces for interoperability with echelons 
above corps, joint and NATO nations. 'I"No unique 
characteristics of the MSE system are fixed subscriber 
telephone numbers and flood search routing. A user's telephone 
number remains the same regardless of their location on the 
battlefield. Flood search routing enables calls to be routed 
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automatically over an optimum route on a call-by call basis. 
This technique negates the need for pre-stored routing tables 
to make call connections. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. A1-5, A1-11, 
p. A4-10) 
1. KSB PuDcticmal Areas 
The equipment configuration of MSE forms five 
functional areas: area coverage, wire subscriber access, 
mobile subscriber access, subscriber terminals, and system 
control. This functional representation is presented in Figure 
7. (Operational and Organizational Plan for Mobile Subscriber 
Equipment (MSE) System, 1986, p. 3-6) 
l'igure 7. MSE System Functional Areas 
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2. liSa Architecture 
To integrate the five functional areas, MSE uses a 
tri-level architecture: the grid system, the extension system, 
and users. The grid system provides the backbone (major switch 
to major switch) for inter-connectivity (i.e., area coverage) 
and network management (system control) throughout the MSE 
area. The extension system supports the wire subscriber access 
from small switches located at the users' Command Post (CP) 
into the backbone system. The users portion of the 
architecture encompasses the user Installed, Owned, operated 
and Maintained (IOM) subscriber terminals and mobile 
subscriber access. The relationship between the MSE 
architecture and functional areas is depicted in Figure 8. 
(Schuam, pp. 6-22, Fall 1984) 
Figure 8. MSE Architecture and Functional Area 
Relationship 
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•. DDLO'IDII'r coaarr 
The MSE system at the corps level is designed to suppc:: 
communications for up to five divisions. The corps area of 
responsibility during battle is approximately 37,500 square 
kilometers, or 150 km x 250 km. The system is self organizing 
and provides secure voice and data communications on an 
automatic, discrete address, fixed directory basis using a 
form of flood search. Links between communications sites 
(i.e., switching) is normally accomplished through the use of 
radio •shots•. The radio shots are UHF Line of Sight (LOS). If 
distance prevents the use of single leg LOS, relays (if 
plausible) or satellites are employed. (Bingham, Appendix A, 
p. 1) 
1. IISB Core unit, the Signal Battalion 
The basic building block for MSE communications is the 
signal battalion. Each division has an organic signal 
battalion and the corps signal brigade has three signal 
battalions. A signal battalion has four companies. These 
companies are Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), A, 
B, and C. For ease of understanding, the following description 
is focused on the division signal battalion. 
a. HeadQuarter• a.acf HeadQuarter• COIII'aD.Y (BBC) 
The primary mission of the HHC is to provide 
support to the line companies (A B, and C) . The major sections 
of HHC are command, Operations and Intelligence (OP/INTEL), 
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administrative and maintenance (motor, CE, COMSEC). The 
OP/INTEL section (53) is responsible for the planning, 
installation and management of the MSE communications system 
within the division's area. System control is exercised 
through the use of a System Control Center (SCC) assemblage. 
(Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations 
Management Course, Dec 1991, p. A2-9) 
b. Area S1pal CQIIIP&IW 
Alpha and Bravo companies are called Area Signal 
Companies and are identical. Their mission is to establish the 
backbone system and provide switching assemblages to CPs. Each 
company has approximately 160 personnel divided into three 
platoons: HQ, and two nodal (first and second) . The HQ platoon 
supports company operations and consists of an administrative 
section and a motor maintenance section. The nodal platoons 
are identical. Each of these platoons has one Node (major 
switching center), four Small Extension Nodes (SENs, small 
switch) and two Radio Access Units (RAUs, one local at the 
node center (NC) and one remote (RRAU)). (Student's Training 
Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management course, Dec 1991, 
pp. A2-10, A2-11) 
c. S1gzal SU,pport CQIIIP&IW 
Charlie company, called the Signal Support 
Company, is responsible for establishing a Large Extension 
Node (LEN, large switch) . It has approximately 55 personnel 
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and is divided into two platoons: Company Headquarters and 
Support Platoon. The company headquarters is functionally the 
same as the area signal companies. The support platoon is 
equipped with a LEN and FM retransmission section. (Student's 
Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course, 
Dec 1991, pp. A2-12, A2-13) 
2 . The Gri4 ay.t-
The grid system portion of MSE architecture 
,, ~ompasses the functional areas of area system and system 
~rol. Esta~lishing the functionality of the area system is 
accomplished by positioning and inter-connecting node centers 
(NCs). System control is done through the SCC. 
a. Area ~t-
To establish NC positioning criteria and areas of 
responsibility the corps area is divided into two coverage 
regions, front and rear. The front area extends from the 
Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) to the rear of the divisional 
sector. The rear area is from the division rear boundary to 
the corps rear boundary. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. 2-4, 2-7} 
( 1) Corps Forward Area. Within the corps forward 
area, each division is responsible for establishing their 
portion of the MSE backbone system and tying-in to adjacent 
35 
forces (left to right) . 22 The division's signal battalion is 
used to accomplish this task. Each signal battalion 
establishes and links four Nodes within its perspective 
division's boundaries. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. A2-4, A2-7) 
( 2) Corps Rear Area. The corps rear area is 
~upported exclusively by the corps signal brigade. The signal 
brigade provides 22 Nodes, in addition to the subordinate 
divisional assets, to complete the grid system. The 
responsibility of establishing connectivity to the division 
backbones rests with the signal brigade (higher to lower) . 
b. NC Ccmaectivity iD Bu,pport o~ tJJe Area Bl'Wt .. 
The primary objective of the node center is to 
provide area coverage. NC capabilities include: tandem digital 
switching; management and recommendations for subscriber 
location; primary gateway access; access for MSRT subscribers; 
interface for SCC; access for 24 local wire subscribers; and 
access for one LAN. Each node center is composed of a Node 
Center Switch (NCS, AN/TTC-47), Nodal Management Facility 
(NMF, AN/TSQ-154), two RAUs (local and remote, AN/TRC-191), 
and four LOS (AN/TRC-190 (V3)) assemblages. (Student's Training 
Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, 
pp. A3-19, A3-20) 
22 The rules of thumb for responsibility are: 
supporting to supported; higher to lower; and left to right. 
See Joint Pub 6-0, p. I-4. 
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fl) Node Center Switch (NCS), AN/TTC-47. The 
primary function of the switch is to route calls between 
switches by the flood search technique. It is the principal 
network interface for RAU, SEN, LEN, NATO Analog Interface 
(NAil, and Digital NATO Interface (DNI). The NCS is comprised 
of two HMMWV shelter mounted assemblages (switching shelter 
(ON-306/TTC-47) and operations shelter (OL-413/TTC-47)) . Power 
is provided by one PU-753, 10 kilowatt (kw) trailer mounted 
generator. The two assemblages form the AN/TTC-47 switching 
and operations facility. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. B1-7) 
The ON-306/TTC-47 (switching shelter) is often 
referred to as the COMSEC shelter. It is unmanned and contains 
the trunk encryption devices and time division switching 
group. 
The OL-413/TTC-47 (operations shelter) is used 
for manual operator service. Its major components are: 
switching processor; downsize routing subsystem; digital 
computer; and status display and keyboard. The operator 
activities (after system initialization) are similar to that 
of a civilian telephone switch operator. Their primary 
responsibility is to provide assistance to subscribers. This 
is done through the use of the Call Service Position (CSP) . NC 
switch capacity is indicted in Table II. (Student's Training 
Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course,Dec 1991, 
pp. 81-10, B1-31) 
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Table II. NC SWITCH CAPACITY 
24 Local Wire Subscribers 
648 Digital Terminations 
8 Trunk Terminations 
10 Digital In-band Signaling Buffers 
16 Digital Transmission Groups 
20 Digital Receivers 
24 Digital Loops (used by sig spt) 
4 Conference Bridge Units 
Interface for STANAG 5040 (NAI) 
Packet Switch Capacity: 
5 Trunks to Adjacent NC/LEN PS 
5 Trunks to SEN PS 
1 LAN Interface 
(2) Node Management Facility (N.MF), AN/TSQ-154. 
The TSQ-154 is deployed 1n support of both NCs and LENs. It 
provides the equipment and space required by the site OIC to 
manage the resources of the NC or LEN and connected elements. 
The management facility consists of a shelter mounted HMMWV 
and is equipped with an intercom, Electroluminescent Display 
Terminal (EDT) and keyboard, and Digital Non-secure Voice 
Terminal (DNVT). (Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal 
Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. B1-39) 
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(3) AN/TRC-190(V3). Connectivity between NCs is 
accomplished using the TRC-190 (V3) . The NC has four TRC-
190 (V3) s. All LOS assemblages consist of a HMMWV mounted 
shelter with a PU-751 (5 kw) trailer mounted generator. The 
TRC-190 employs a highly directional antenna for point to 
point communications (LOS to LOS). Each TRC-190(V3) contains 
four Ultra High Frequency (UHF) line of sight (LOS) radio sets 
(AN/GRC-226). Up to three radios may be active at one time 
(the fourth is a spare). There are two models of the GRC-226. 
The RT-1537/GRC-226(V) is a band I radio operating from 225-
400 MHz with 10 watts of power output. The RT-1538/GRC-226(V) 
is a band III radio operating from 1,350 to 1,850 MHz with 5 
watts of power output. These radios provide multichannel 
circuits in support of the MSE system. (Student's Training 
Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, 
pp. C2-13, C2-50) 
For network survivability a NC is typically 
linked to three other nodes. This leaves nine radio stacks 
available at a node to accommodate SEN, LEN, RRAU, and NATO 
interfaces. Figure 9 depicts a fully established NC. 
(Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations 
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c. SJ'Wt.. Ccmtrol 
System control is accomplished using the System 
Control Center (SCC) assemblage. The sec is responsible for: 
network management; frequency management ( RAU, MSRT, and LOS) ; 
terrain analysis (for LOS path profiling); system activation 
and reconfiguration; equipment and personnel status. Each 
division has one organic sec (OP/INTEL section of HHC, signal 
battalion). The corps has two SCCs (located in the OP/INTEL 
section of HHC, signal brigade). The division sec is comprised 
of two HMMWV mounted shelters (technical and 
management/planning) and one PU-753 (10 kw) trailer mounted 
generator. A corps sec has an additional management/planning 
shelter and PU-751 (5 kw) generator. 
Each division is responsible for system control 
within their sector. The division sec is active at all times. 
The corps sec is responsible for overall system management. 
Under static conditions, one corps sec is capable of managing 
the system. The second corps sec may remain in reserve or, 
under more dynamic circumstances, be used to control selected 
division teams. The sec ..:.s not stand alone. It relies on 
established communications links for information inputs and is 
therefore co-located with a NC or LEN. (Student's Training 
Course Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, 
pp. E1-3, E1-10) 
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d. Grid System in Toto 
As stated earlier the grid system encompasses the 
functionalities of area coverage and system control. Area 
coverage is established with the radio inter-connectivity of 
the nodal backbone. This connectivity provides the links over 
which information is transmitted. MSE at the corps level is 
designed and equipped for the employment of up to 42 nodes. 
s:.·stem control of this behemoth is directed from the sec. 
While each division possesses a sec for internal system 
management, overall system management is the responsibility of 
the corps. The grid system in toto appears as depicted in 
Figure 10 (triangles indicate Nodes, circles indicate SCC). 
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Pigure 10. MSE Grid System 
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3. Tbe aztenaion Sy•t .. 
The extension system portion of the MSE architecture 
encompasses the wire subscriber access functional area. This 
area entails all communications switching and transmission 
equipment at all CPs (e.g., Tactical Operations Center (TOC) 
and Tactical Command Post (TAC)) . This area also includes 
access for non-MSE subscribers through Radio to Wire Interface 
(RWI). The two types of extension switches available are the 
Large Extension Switch (LEN) and the Small Extension Switch 
(SEN). (Project Manager, Mobile Subscriber Equipment, 1 August 
19 8 6 , pp . 1-6 ) 
a. Large .Bxtemr.:Lon Node (LBN) 
The mission of the LEN is to provide 
communications support to large command posts (e.g., COSCOM, 
DISCOM). LEN capabilities include: network access switching; 
local service switch; CNR access (KY-90 location dependent); 
commercial office access; and packet switch support. The LEN 
is capable of supporting up to 176 local subscribers. Each LEN 
is composed of a Large Extension Node Switch (LENS, AN/TTC-
46), Node Management Facility (NMF, AN/TSQ-154), one RAU 
(local, AN/TRC-191}, and one LOS (AN/TRC-190(V4}) assemblage. 
(Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations 
Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. B1-40, B1-44) 
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(l) Large Extension Node SWitch (LENS, TTC-46). 
The primary function of the LENS is technically the same as 
the NCS but with some quantity and interface differences. The 
LENS sexves as a network access switch and supports local 
switching requirements. Its primary interfaces are to 
conmercial office (local commercial telephone system} and 
packet switch subscribers (via TYC-20} • The LENS is comprised 
of two HMMWV shelter mounted assemblages (switching shelter 
(ON-305/TTC-46} and operations shelter (OL-412/TTC-46}) . Power 
is provided by one PU-753 (10 kw} trailer mounted generator. 
The two assemblages form the AN/TTC-46 switching and 
operations facility. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. 81-40, 81-
44) 
The LENS provides wire termination for up to 
176 local subscribers through the use of junction boxes (J-
1077) and Remote MUltiplexer Combiners (RMC, TD-1234}. The 
RMC' s support up to 80 subscribers and the junction boxes 
accommodate the remaining 96. Table III details the difference 
in LEN versus NC switch capacity. (Student's Training Course 
Guide for Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. 
82-38, 82-44) 
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Table III. LEN VERSUS NC SWITCH CAPACITY 
Digital Terminations 
Trunk Signaling Buffers 
Digital In-band Signaling Buffers 
Digital Transmission Groups 
Digital receivers 
Digital Loops 
Analog Loops for Commercial Interface 
Conference Bridge Units 





















(2) Node Management Facility (N.MF), AN/TSQ-154. 
See Chapter III, section 2.b. (2). 
(3) AN/TRC-190 (V4). Connectivity from the LEN to 
the NC's is accomplished using the TRC-190(V4). The LEN has 
one TRC-190 (V4) . Assemblage description for the V4 is the same 
as the TRC-190(V3) (see Chapter III, section 2.b. (3)) with the 
exception of the number of radios. The TRC-190(V4) contains 
only two UHF LOS radio sets (AN/GRC-226). Radio capabilities 
description is the same as presented for the V3. For network 
survivability a LEN is linked to two NCs. A deployed LEN is 
depicted in Figure 11. (Student's Training Course Guide for 






















b. S..ll ~teu.tc= Node (SD) 
There are two types of SENs: SEN V1, and SEN V2. 
The mission of the SEN is to provide network access and local 
switching. The SEN is intended for small CPs (brigade, 
separate battalions, etc.) . Assemblage composition of both SEN 
variations is identical. The difference between the SENs is in 
switching capacity. The SEN consists of two HMMWV mounted 
shelters (switch and LOS) . 
(1) SEN Switch (AN/TTC-48 (Vl&V2)). The primary 
component of the TTC-48 is two automatic switchboards (SB-
4303) . The switchboards provide automatic routing of calls and 
allow for operator intercept/ assistance. The V1 and V2 
support up to 26 and 41 subscribers respectively. Power to the 
TTC-48 is provided by a trailer mounted generator (PU-753, 10 
kw). (Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations 
Management Course, Dec 1991, p. A3-13, pp. B5-6, BS-31) 
(2) AN/TRC-190 (Vl). LOS radio links are 
established between the SEN and NC via the TRC-190(V1). The 
assemblage description of the TRC-190(V1) is identical to the 
TRC-190(V3) and V4 except for the number of radios. The TRC-
190 (V1) has two radios (GRC-226, one is spare). A SEN V1 site 
is depicted in Figure 12. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
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Pigure 12. Small Extension Node (SEN) Vl Site 








Radio to wire integration supports CNR FM users 
who wish to enter the MSE network. Each signal battalion has 
four KY-90s (sometimes referred to as a Network Radio 
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Interface (NRI) device) to accomplish integration. The KY-
90s are connected to a VRC-12 series radio (e.g., RT-524) via 
an umbilical plug and wired (WD-1) into a switchboard (SB-
4303). Operator interrupt is required to initiate RWI calls. 
The KY-90s are dispersed to provide optimum coverage of the 
division area. (Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal 
Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. B5-18, B5-19l 
6. U8er• 
The third leg of the MSE architecture is users. System 
users access the MSE system through the use of land line 
devices or mobile subscriber equipment. The functionality of 
access is termed Subscriber Terminals and Mobile Subscriber 
Access respectively. 
•· SUb•cr1ber ~~nal• 
The three primary terminals available to a static 
user are the Digital Non-secure Voice Terminal (DNVT, TA-
1035), Digital Tactical Facsimile (FAX, UXC-7) and Single 
Subscriber Terminal (SST) . The DNVT is a four wire militarized 
push-button telephone. It operates off of an automated 
switchboard (connected by WD-1, J-1077, or RMC). The UXC-7 
operates as a civilian FAX does. 
transmission is accomplished with 
Dial-up support of FAX 
the DNVT or Digital 
Subscriber Voice Terminal (DSVT) . The SST is a data terminal 
that provides microprocessor functions for data/message 
handling, transmission and processing. The SST accesses the 
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MSE network through the data port on either the DNVT or DSVT. 
The SST enables data passed through the MSE system to 
interface with the AN/TYC-39 automatic message switch at EAC. 
The DNVT, FAX, and SST operate in the plain (the devices do 
not contain encryption modules). When communicating from a NC, 
LEN or SEN encryption of the signal occurs when processed for 
off site transmission. (Student's Training Course Guide for 
Nodal Operations Management Course, Dec 1991, p. A3-4, p. A3-
8l 
b. Mobile Sub•criber Ace••• 
Mobile subscriber access into the MSE system is 
accomplished using a Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephone 
Terminal (MSRT, VRC-97). The MSRT provides a means for mobile 
subscribers to communicate with secure voice or secure data 
(using FAX) . 
(1) Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephone Terminal. 
The MSRT provides a subscriber the means of discretely 
addressing switched common-users. Features of the MSRT 
include: internal COMSEC; reduces jamming and interference (by 
means of frequency hopping) ; execution of automatic 
affiliation, disaffiliation and reaffiliation. The MSRT 
consists of a Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal (DSVT, KY-68), 
Very High Frequency (VHF) radio (RT-1539) and installation 
kit. The MSRT is typically mounted in command Armored 
Personnel Carriers (e.g., M113, M577 or M2) and HMMWVs. There 
50 
is also a user stand-alone kit available. The DSVT is a 
securable militarized push-button mobile telephone. VHF 
transmission of the signal is accomplished by the RT-1539. 
(Student's Training Course Guide for Nodal Operations 
Management Course, Dec 1991, pp. A3-5, A3-7) 
The RT-1539 is a full duplex communications 
unit. The signal from the RT-1539 accesses an available RT-
1539 in a Radio Access Unit (RAU) and is linked into the 
network. The two frequency coverage modes of the radio are for 
CONUS and OCONUS. RAU and MSRT frequency coverage is depicted 
in Table IV. 
Table IV. RAU & MSRT FREQUENCIES 
Low band Highband 
CONUS 30-35 MHZ 40-50 MHZ 
OCONUS 30-51 MHZ 59-88 MHZ 
RAU RCV XMIT 
MSRT XMIT RCV 
A fully deployed corps has approximately 1900 
MSRTs in sector and 92 RAUs to support interface. There are 
two configurations for the RAU: local and remote. (MSE Primer 
for Small-Unit Leaders, 1988, p. 2-29, 2-31) 
(2) Local Radio Access Unit (RAU, AN/TRC-191). 
Local radio access units (RAUs) are found at NCs and LENs. The 
mission of the RAU is to provide radio telephone interface 
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from mobile subscribers to the network. The RAU is composed of 
a HMMWV mounted shelter and a tailer mounted generator (PU-
751, 5 kw). The major component of the shelter are eight RT-
1539s. The radios are accessed by the mobile subscriber on a 
first-come-first-served basis. A RAU "footprint" for area 
coverage is a radius of approximately 15 kilometers. 
(3) Remote Radio Access Unit (RRAU, AN/TRC-190). 
The RRAU is exactly the same as a RAU with the addition of a 
AN/TRC-191(Vl) for LOS radio connectivity to a NC. 
C. SYSTBM IH'l'D.OPDABILI'l'Y 
MSE is designed to interface with other communications 
systems. These systems include TRI-TAC, commercial telephone, 
NATO, and CNR. (Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE Architecture, 
1988, p. 1-16) 
1. TRI-TAC Interface 
MSE is fully compatible with TRI-TAC equipment to 
include switches, terminals, line of sight, satellite, and 
cable systems. Gateway interface to the TRI-TAC system occurs 
through the NC. (Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) 
Architecture, 1988, p. 1-16) 
2. Commercial Office Interface 
Commercial office interface allows subscribers to 
access the local commercial telephone system. The LENS is 
equipped to accommodate two commercial lines. Each SEN is 
capable of one. 
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3 • lfA'l'O Interface 
The MSE system provides for non-secure analog and 
secure digital communications to miliary systems complying 
with Standardization Agreements ( STANAGs) 5040 (analog 
interface), 4206 through 4212 and 4214 (digital interface). 
Analog interface is accomplished using a NATO Analog Interface 
(NAil converter (CV-4002/G). One CV-4002/G is authorized to 
each signal battalion. The NAI device can be installed at a 
NCS or interfaced using a LOS V2. Figure 13 shows the NAI 
configured at a NC. Each NCS is capable of NATO digital 
interface or direct cabling of a NATO switch. (Mobile 
Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Architecture, 1988, p. 1-17) 
Figure 13. Nato Analog Interface (NAI) Configuration 
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4. worldwide Interface 
MSE system interface to worldwide access is executed 
through the EAC communications system. MSE is compatible with 
and can access both the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) and 
the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) . AUTOVON is accessed 
through the EAC gateway. AUTODIN is accessed through an EAC 
AN/TYC-39 record traffic facility. Interface to either network 
is done through the NCS to AN/TTC-39 circuit switch gateway. 
D. S~Y 
The following is a recapitulation of the major elements of 
the MSE system. 
1. Rode Center (RC) 
Major switching center of the MSE backbone system. 
Composed of a switch, four LOS riggs, and a RAU. Is capable of 
interfacing with five NCs (all LOS), six SENs (four through 
LOS, two cabled\, three RAUs (two through LOS, one cabled) ,one 
LEN (LOS}, and one sec (cabled). It has the capability of 
supporting 26 local wire subscribers. See Figure 9. 
2. B.Y•t .. Control Center (SCC) 
Provides system management functions. Consists of two 
assemblages (technical and management/planning) at the 
division and three (technical and two management/planning) at 
the corps levels. Division sec is responsible for division 
sector management. Corps sec is overall responsible for corps 
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area. The sec is cabled to NCS or LENS. Figure 14 depicts a 
corps level sec site. 
Figure 14. Corps System Control Center (SCC) Site 
3. Large Bxtenaion Node (LBN} 
Provides communications support and access to the MSE 
network for large command posts (COSCOM, DISCOM, etc.). 
Consists of a switch, local RAU, and one LOS rig. Linked into 
NC (either cabled or multichannel multiplexed LOS radio 
transmission) for network access. Capable of supporting up to 
176 local subscribers. See Figure 11. 
4. Small Bxtenaion Node (SBN) 
Provides communications support and access to the MSE 
network for small CPs (brigade and separate battalion). There 
are two variations (Vl and V2}. Composition of the variants is 
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the same: a switch and a LOS rig. Ties into NC for network 
access. Capacities are 26 and 41 subscribers respectively. See 
Figure 12. 
5. Radio Access Unit (RAO), AN/TRC-191 
Provides mobile subscriber access to the MSE network. 
Local assemblages are single shelter and are located at NC and 
LEN. RRAU is the same as RAU but has a LOS for NC tie-in. 
Radius of coverage is 15 km. For radio bands see Table IV. 
RAU's are positioned on the battlefield to provide footprint 
overlap. See Figure 9 for local RAU connectivity. A RRAU site 
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Figure 15. Remote Radio Access Unit (RRAU) Site 
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6. Line of Sight (LOS) Aaa.mblagea 
LOS assemblages are used to establish radio links 
between sites. There are four variations of the LOS rig: V1, 
V2, V3, V4. LOS connectivity is accomplished using the GRC-226 
UHF radio. Planning range for the GRC-226 is 40 km. The GRC-
226 have two band variants: band I (225-400 MHz}; band III 
(1,350-1,850 MHz}. The V1-V3 are equipped with a spare radio. 
LOS functionality and number of radios is summarized in Table 
v. 
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7 ~ User OWned and Operated Bquipment 
GRC-226 
There are four devices that are authorized and issued 
to a user. These devices are: DNVT, FAX, SST and MSRT. 
a. D1g1t:al. Noll-secure Vo1ce Terminal (DNVT) 
The DNVT is the workhorse for a static subscriber. 
It is a militarized four wire, push-button telephone. The DNVT 
is connected to a switch by WD-1 (wire} , junction box or 
Remote Multiplexer Combiner (RMC) . As its name indicates it is 
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not a secure means of communications. The DNVT is depicted in 
Figure 16. 
Pigure 16. Digital Non-secure Voice Telephone (DNVT) 
b. Facsimile 7'e.rm.1nal (FAX) 
The lightweight digital facsimile terminal (FAX) 
is a militarized four wire FAX machine. It is employed in 
conjunction with the MSRT (using DSV'l' port) or DNVT. See 
Figure 17. 
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Pigure 17. Facsimile Terminal {FAX) 
c. Single SUbscriber Terminal (SST} 
The SST is a microprocessor which functions as a 
data/message handling, transmission and processing device. It 
operates over the data port of the DNVT and DSVT. Data passed 
by the SST over MSB enables interoperability with the AN/TYC-
39 automatic message switch at EAC. 
d. llobile SUbscriber Radio ~'..!lephone Terminal 
The MSRT supports mobile subscribers with secure 
voice and data transmissions. It consists of a Digital 
Subscriber Voice Terminal (DSVT), radio, and installation kit. 
It is either vehicular mounted or stand alone. Access to the 
MSE network is provided via the RAU. Typical MSRT HMMWV 
installation is depicted in Figure 18. 
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Pigure 18. Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephone Terminal 
8. Radio to Wire Integration (RWI) 
Radio to Wire Integration is accomplished with the use 
of the KY-90. Each signal battalion has four KY-90s. The KY-90 
is connected to an FM radio and wired in to a switch. Operator 
int12rface is required to initiate an RWI call. Figure 19 
depicts the KY-90. 
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' • J 
Figure 19. Radio to Wire Interface (RWI), KY-90 
9. Counectivity 
Multiple links between each NC is paramount to ensure 
path survivability. A NC is inter-connected to a minimum of 
two other NCs. The SCC operations team will strive to position 
NCs to ensure multiple NC to NC connectivity. The LEN links to 
two different nodes. If one node fails the LEN can continue to 
access the network. The SENs supporting brigades are linked to 
different NCs to reduce the effects of NC outages. Figure 20 
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IV. 
A. tniii'IBD COIDIUD C2 STaOC'l'tmB 
Unified commanders are faced with supporting national 
objectives in the face of historic world changes. To support 
national objectives a unified commander must develop theater 
strategies that address this rapidly changing world. 
Strategies must exploit technological advancements (C3I and 
weapons systems) and provide the flexibility to respond to 
contingency operations ranging from humanitarian aid to high 
intensity conflicts (e.g., Desert Shield/Storm). Constraints 
imposed on a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) are down-sized forces, 
reduced forward-basing and fiscal resources. The operational 
shift from theater conflict to regional contingency 
operations, and its inherent requirement for rapidity, has 
necessitated an emphasis on Joint Task Force (JTF) operations. 
The unified CINC's C2 structure must be flexible to support a 
myriad of JTF operations over a range of diverse situations. 
The required agility of a C2 system in support of JTF 
operations has driven a paradigm shift in the unified 
commands' traditional three-echelon C2 structure to a two-
echelon C2 structure. (U.S. Pacific Command Contingency 
Operations C3I Support Plan, June 1992, pp. 1-2) 
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<< ««<«_, ________________________________________ _
1. Tbree-•cbeloa. of Co--end and Control 
Traditionally a unified command C2 structure is three 
tier. This structure is based on directing operations in 
theater wide or global conflicts. In this concept a CINC 
provides theater direction to the designated component (or 
subunified commander) who provides planning, support and 
forces to the warfighter. Intelligence support to the CINC is 
provided by the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) . Execution of 
tactical operations, under the direction of the warfighting 
commander, is done by the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF), Army Forces (ARFOR), Air Force Forces (AFFOR), Navy 
Forces (NAVFOR) and Marine Forces (MARFOR). These forces, as 
well as logistics support, are provided to the warfighter by 
the component Service commanders. Although this structure 
passes the •gut check• for the standard military hierarchal 
command concept it does not muster the common sense test for 
expedient C2. To streamline the C2 structure, u.s. Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC) requested the Defense 
Information Systems Agency ~ISA) and the Intelligence 
Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office to undertake 
the project of developing a concept of operation for the 
transition from a three-echelon to a two-echelon C2 structure. 
Figure 21 depicts the three-echelons ~f command and control 
for Pacific Command. (U.S. Pacific Command Contingency 
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Pigure 21. Unified Command Three-Echelon of C2 
2. 'l'Wo·Bchelon• of Comm•nd and Control 
The two-echelon C2 structure emphasizes the direct 
connectivity from the CINC to the Commander Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) . Under this concept the USCINC will monitor the 
situation, designate the CJTF, exercise direct operational 
control over the JTF and provide theater direction. As in the 
three-echelon C2 structure, Service commanders will provide 
forces and necessary logistic support to the CJTF, as directed 
by the CINC. The CJTF will coordinate combat forces and 
provide direction to the component commanders on the 
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prosecution of tactical operations. The Pacific Command two-
echelon C2 structure is depicted in Figure 22. (U.S. Pacific 
Command Contingency Operations C3I Support Plan, June 1992, 
pp. 2-3} 
lr----JICNC--1: I~ I 
I em I 
1 l 
Pigure 22. Two-Echelon C2 Structure 
B. JOIH'l' TASK PORCB COIIMONICA'l'IONS 
Although the previous section presented the baseline C2 
structure for the unified command, the command relationship 
transition during JTF operations is tenuous (e.g., from 
amphibious assault to activation of the commander of land 
forces (COMLANFOR)) . A more complete representation of typical 
command relationships during peacetime and the activation of 
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a JTF are presented in Figure 23. (JCS communications Manual, 
1988, p. 1-2) 
NOTES: 
(1) Cmd.......,.,. wtwn CLANDRlR 1Kl1M111f 
(2) Cmd IWidnhfp wtwn CLANDFOR nat .a.d 
(3) Cmd IWidnhfp.,.., MAAFOR ......,..,_ 
...... 
(4) COMNAVFOR may aperaln 1UPPDrt tJI CJTF 
(5) Cmd....,.,., dwtng....,.. ..... tJI Clpllldon 
prlartDtlrne MMFOR are.....,..._. lllhln 
Pigure 23. Typical Command Relationships 
1. Joint Task Porce Communicationa Links 
Command relationships dictate communications paths. 
Accordingly, the CJTF must be able to communicate with the 
supported CINC and all assigned forces (i.e., Air Force, Army, 
Navy, Marine, and special operations) . Communications are 
provided between units/commands as follows: 
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• senior to subordinate (i.e., higher to lower) 
• supporting to supported 
• reinforcing to reinforced 
• left to right 
• between adjacent units as directed by common senior 
• by unit gaining attachment 
The JTF communications plan must encompass 
predeployment, advance forces deployment, deployment, 
employment, and redeployment . In addition to the command 
relationship driven communications links the JTF must 
incorporate the extension of the Defense Communications System 
(DCS) into the joint operational area (JOA) . Connectivity from 
the hub (JTF HQ) to external activities (CINC, DCS, forces) is 
accomplished utilizing various systems. The three typical 
systems are the Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) Super High 
Frequency (SHF) satellite system, High Frequency (HF) 
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) radio system, or terrestrial 
multichannel systems. Survivability of this C3 system is 
paramount. Based on assets available, dispersed terminals 
providing multiple links between major headquarters is 
preferred. (JCS Communications Manual, 1988, p. 1-3, p. K-3-1) 
2. COIIIIINDicationa Support to the JTP HQ 
The CJTF may request communications support from the 
Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) . Authority for 
deployment of the JCSE rests with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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(JCS). If approved for use, the JCSE will typically support 
both the JTF HQ and the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) HQ. The JCSE respons1bilities include the 
Installation, Operation and Maintenance (IOMJ of 
Communications and Electronics (CE) facilities to support 
these HQs. If required, the JCSE is capable of the IOM of 
satellite terminals at service component and CINC 
headquarters. The JCSE will also provide connectivity between 
the JSOTF HQ and its subordinates. (JCS Communications Manual, 
1988, p. 1-3) 
If the JCSE is not available for support it is 
incumbent upon the CJTF to identify CE support requirements to 
the supported CINC. The CINC will task service components for 
communications assets. (JCS Communications Manual, 1988, p. 1-
3) 
3. SUbordinate Porce Communicationa and Blectronica 
Installation of the Joint Communications Network (JCN} 
is accomplished by the individual services' execution of their 
joint CE responsibilities. The core of the JCN is the 
switching center. Accordingly, the following is a description 
of JTF subordinate force HQ major C2 links, switching 
equipment and responsibilities. 
a. COllllllaDder Army l'orc:e• (COJIAIUrOR) 
The COMARFOR major subordinate units are maneuver 
divisions and support commands (e.g. , COSCOM) . All Army 
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swit~hes are Tri-Service Tactical Communications System (TRI-
TAC) compatible (most are hybrids). The Army gateway switching 
assemblages are the AN/TTC-39 (voice traffic) and the AN/TYC-
39 (record traffic). The tactical switches are the AN/TTC-
46/47/48 (MSE, see Chapter III). COMARFOR responsibilities 
include, but are not limited to those identified below. (JCS 
Communications Manual, 1988, pp. 1-5, 1-6) 
• IOM of CE facilities required to accomplish basic tasks 
and responsibilities os assigned. 
• Provision of personnel and equipment for air traffic 
control in coordination with Commander Air Force Forces 
( COMAFFOR) . 
• Provision of personnel and equipment for air defense 
operations in coordination with Are:a Air Defense Commander 
(AADC) • 
• Provision of communications assets to support air field 
security operations in coordination with COMAFFCR. 
• Provision of personnel and equipment for "link-up" 
communications with Marine forces and special operation 
forces. 
• Provision of terrestr1al multichannel communications from 
the COMARFOR to the JTF HQ and terminate all joint 
communications at COMARFOR and Special Forces Operating 
Base (SFOB) HQs. 
• Provision of base support to JCSE (when deployed) and 
other components having communications terminals at ARFOk 
and SFOB HQs. 
b. Commander Air Force Forces (COJIAFFOR) 
The major subordinate activities to the COMAFFOR 
are the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Wing Operation 
Center (WOC) and Control and Reporting Center (CRC) . The Air 
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Force switch assembles are the TRI-TAC AN/TTC-39 (voice) and 
AN/TYC-39 (record) . These switches are used to support C2 at 
all levels (base and gateway communications). COMAFFOR 
responsibilities include, but are not limited to those 
identified below. (JCS Communications Manual, 1988, p. 1-6) 
• IOM of CE facilities required to accomplish basic tasks 
and responsibilities as assigned. 
• Provision (or arrangement) for aircraft movement CRC 
facilities en route, at staging bases and in designated 
areas of operation. Coordination of air operations as 
required (i.e., COMARFOR, COMNAVFOR, COMMARFOR, etc.). 
• Coordinate for aircraft control and radio frequencies. 
• State and distribute navigational aids information. 
• Planning and provision for communications to support Joint 
Tactical Air Operations (JTAO) . 
• Coordinate for and establish procedures for air traffic 
control and regulation within combat area. Provide 
personnel and equipment in support of this tasking. 
• Provision of effective radar surveillance necessary for 
identification and air defense operations. 
• Assign and distribute Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
operating instructions and procedures. 
• Provision of terrestrial multichannel communications from 
the COMAFFOR to the JTF HQ and terminate all joint 
communications at COMAFFOR and Air Force Special 
Operations Base (AFSOB) HQs. 
• Provision of base support to JCSE (when deployed) and 
other components having communications terminals at AFFOR 
and AFSOB HQs. 
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c. Co,..nder Naval ,ore•• (COIINAWOR) 
The COMNAVFOR has no specific major subordinate 
command HQ. The Navy does not possess any large switchboards. 
Commanders of naval task forces/groups/units requiring ship-
shore-ship termination for record traffic and point-to-point 
teletype connectivity request and establish terminations in 
accordance with normal Fleet Tele-communications Operating 
Procedures (FTOP) . The COMNAVFOR CE responsibilities include, 
but are not limited to those identified below. (JCS 
Communications Manual, 1988, p. 1-3, pp. 1-6, 1-7) 
• Provide and operate CE facilities required to accomplish 
basic tasks and responsibilities as assigned. 
• Provide and operate CE facilities in support of air 
operations as required. 
• Identify and distribute ship-borne navigational aids, 
frequency channel and station identifiers. 
• Provide terminal communications equipment at the NAVFOR HQ 
(afloat or ashore) . 
• Provide base support to JCSE (when deployed) and other 
components having communications terminals at NAVFOR and 
Navy Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG). Terminate all 
joint communications at these HQ (i.e., COMNAVFOR and 
NSWTG). 
• Ensure UHF SATCOM terminal, HF radio, teletype and voice 
terminal equipment are available aboard ship to meet ship-
to-shore requirements. 
• Provide support to Marine Corps amphibious force while 
embarked. 
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d. C~•nder Jlar.:Lue l'orce• (COIIIIAlaOR) 
The major subordinate elements to the COMMARFOR 
are maneuver divisions and air wings. The Marine Corps, like 
the Army and Air Force, possess TRI-TAC switches. COMMARFOR 
responsibilities include, but are not limited to those 
identified below. (JCS Communications Manual, 1988, p. 1-1, p. 
1-7) 
• IOM of CE facilities required to accomplish basic tasks 
and responsibilities as assigned. 
• When afloat communications to the COMMARFOR will be 
provided by COMNAVFOR. When ashore the COMMARFOR will 
provide personnel and equipment for establishment of 
terrestrial multichannel communications from COMMARFOR HQ 
to the JTF HQ, "link-up" communications with COMARFOR, and 
terminate all joint communications at COMMARFOR. 
• Provide base support to JCSE (when deployed) and other 
components located at COMMARFOR. 
• If Marine Corps air operations are required, the COMMARFOR 
will provide, within the MARFOR Area of Responsibility 
(AOR): aircraft control and navigational assistance; 
coordination of aircraft control and reporting radio 
frequencies; promulgation of navigational aid information; 
Close Air Support (CAS) communications; and effective 
radar surveillance for IFF and air defense operations. 
•. Jo.:Lut Spec.:Lal Operat.:Lo.a. 'J'a•Jc :rorce ( JSO'J':r J 
The major subordinate units of the JSOTF are the 
Special Forces Operations Base (SFOB, Army proponent), Air 
Force Special Operations Base (AFSOB), and the Navy Special 
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Warfare Task Group (NSWTGl . 23 There are no communications 
responsibilities for this organization. Communications are 
provided to the JSOTF by the JCSE or the component services 
(as described in the sections above). (JCS Communications 
Manual, 1988, pp. 1-3, 1-7) 
4. Defenae Commmicationa Sy•t .. (DCS) 
The Defense Communications System (DCS) is extended 
into the JOA through one of three means. These are: the 
termination of SHF satellite links at designated Defense 
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) entry stations; HF 
radio links into designated HF DCS entry stations; and UHF 
single-channel satellite links into designated UHF ground 
entry points. Terminals (i.e., Tactical Satellite (TACSAT), 
LOS, and tropospheric scatter) required for DCS and tactical 
use are provided by the individual service component or, if 
available and requested, JCS. (JCS Communications Manual, 
1988, pp. 1-3) 
The A~ habitually uses the AN/TSC-85B SHF Satellite 
Communications Terminal in conjunction with a DSCS gateway 
terminal for DSCS interface. The AN/TSC-85B can communicate 
with the AN/TSC-93B, AN/TSC-94, and AN/TSC-100A. Although the 
total channel/group capacity is dependant upon program 
configuration, it can accept up to 96 individual channels and 
23 For a discussion on Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) 




can range from 16 to 4664 kbps. (Secure Tactical Data Network-
3 (STDN-3) Demonstration Report, April 1993, p. G-1) 
5. Su.aary 
In general, and as a minimum, the JTF typically must 
communicate with six major headquarters (supported CINC and 
subordinate forces) and establish links to the DCS. 
Communications are established using GMF SHF satellite, HF ISB 
radio, or terrestrial multichannel systems. The inter-service 
(not intra-service) circuit links are referred to as the Joint 
Communications Network (JCN) . In essence the JCN extends the 
DCS into the tactical arena. Responsibility for maintaining 
the (JCN) rests with the J-6 (Director of Information Systems 
or CE staff equivalent) . Management is accomplished by the JTF 
J6 Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC) via Service 
System Control Centers (SYSCON in general, SCC in the case of 
the Army). The JCN provides the service of both voice and 
record transmissions. An example of a JTF communications 
system diagram is presented in Figure 24. (JCS Communications 
Manual, 1988, p. 2-1, p. K-3-1) 
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C. SDVIC3 o:.IIIDIICA'l'IO.S Di'DOPDABILift 
Communications interoperability is driven by two primary 
factors: doctrine and equipment specifications. 
1. Joint Doctrine 
One of the driving forces behind conmunications inter-
operability is the concept of joint doctrine. The composition 
of the JTP and how the CJTP employs his forces will dictate 
required communications. Doctrine is defined in Joint 
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Publications 1-02 (under revision as of February 1994) as 
•Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of 
two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action 
toward a common objective.• 24 Though austere, this definition 
provides the baseline for joint operations to be built upon. 
Joint Publication 6-0 (C4 Systems, p. I-1) states that the 
fundamental objective of a C4 system is: 
... to get the critical and relevant information to the 
right place in time to allow forces to seize the 
opportunity and meet the objectives of the operational 
continuum. 
The publication goes on to state that the basic C4 doctrine is 
to provide an unbroken chain of communications from the 
National Command Authority (NCA) through the intermediate 
levels to the Service components' subordinate commanders. Both 
are lofty and unequivocal. However, the C4 doctrine fails to 
·provide succinct directives to participants. This may be 
because of the volatile nature of JTF operations and the 
quandary of JTF composition. 25 The current lack of doctrine 
detail is understandable but unacceptable. This situation is 
being rectified by the Joint Staff's J7 (Operational Plans and 
Interoperability) . 
24 Of the 100 Joint Publications under the Joint 
Publications System, 39 are approved, 10 are under revision, 
and 51 are under development. (Sovereign, Class notes, 7 Apr 
1994) 
25 From 1973 to 1993 there were 104 notable 
international crises affecting the U.S .. These crises ranged 
from humanitarian aid (e.g. Hurricane Hugo) to large armed 
conflict (Desert Storm) . (Woodward) 
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Likewise Service specific doctrine guides intra-
service communications systems architectures. Each Service 
habitually establishes their own communications network. To 
control the network each Service has network management cells. 
It is the responsibility of the JTF J6 to mesh these 
disjointed Service networks into a compatible package. 
Gateways must be established between intra-service networks 
and the DCS. Doctrines of the separate Services not 
withstanding, the workhorses of the JCN are the switches. 
2 . SWitching BquipJDeDt 
The backbone of the JCN are the switches. Switches 
provide the routing and connectivity (i.e., gateways) between 
networks. As Service doctrines have evolved so have their 
communications systems to support them. This has led to a 
divergence between Service systems. To bring the Services on-
line for interoperability the TRI-TAC program was instituted 
in May 1971 (see Chapter III). The driving tenet of TRI-TAC 
was that equipment be built to provide technical inter-
operability. 
The heart of the JCN is the TRI-TAC AN/TTC-39 
switchboard. The A~, Air Force and Marines all possess the 
AN/TTC-39. However, twenty-three years after the establishment 
of the TRI-TAC program, there are significant technological 
differences between service AN/TTC-39s. Most notable is the 
routing capability of the switches. 
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All Army MSE tactical switchboards use a flood search 
routing scheme. Flood search routing is an automated process 
for selecting the optimum path for a call to be connected. 
Army AN/TTC-39s (found at the corps level) have been converted 
from deterministic routing to the flood search routing scheme. 
The Air Force has maintained their AN/TTC-39s in a 
deterministic routing mode. Deterministic routing requires 
intensive and detailed system engineering. The route of each 
call through the network is predetermined and programmed into 
the switch. 
The Marine Corps has another version of the AN/TTC-39 
with similar technical differences as the above. With the 
Marine Corps' recent rejection of the MSE operational test and 
evaluation, upgrades to the AN/TTC-39 remain to be seen. 
(Egge) 
Can the services' switchboards "talkH to each other 
through gateways? Unequivocally yes. However, the difference 
in routing schemes has created a seam. In effect, the 
different numbering schemes and dialing procedures have 
created a less than user friendly system. Where the Army has 
instituted fixed subscriber numbers (regardless of 
geographical location) the Air Force has fixed phone numbers 
by location. The confusion that this creates in cross network 
communications can not be understated. 
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3. Interoperability Performance 
Until recently the issue of inter-service 
communications interoperability has received scant support. 
Workarounds for joint operations have been in existence for as 
long as the formation of the first continental army. 26 Joint 
operations were coordinated with service liaison personnel. 
This approach continues today with the emplacement of service 
specific communication equipment at distant ends. However, the 
renewed emphasis on joint operations is coddling a migration 
toward more compatible communications equipment and C2 
systems. 
a. Current Statu• 
The best measure of current joint inter-
operability capabilities is seen in the communication 
performance during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The circuit-
switched common-user network was formed by the interconnection 
of DCS, TRI-TAC, MSE, and Combat Net Radio (CNR). This network 
successfully provided for global connectivity from the 
tactical arena to anywhere in the world. A thumbnail sketch of 
the circuit-switched network is presented in Figure 25. 
(Campen, October 1992, pp. 11-15) 
26 A discussion on the evolution of joint operations 
can be found in Command and Control of Theater Forces: The 
Future of Force Projection Operations by John Cushman (June 
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Figure 25. Circuit Switched Network Connectivity 
The circuit switched network depicted above was 
established to support common users. The network was capable 
of transmitting both secure and non-secure voice, data, and 
facsimile. This network was noted for its example of end-to-
end connectivity using a variety of interconnected strategic 
and tactical communications z:.ystems. A couple of positive 
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lessons learned are identified below. 27 (Wentz, Perspectives 
on C3I Performance in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 
Communications, October 1991, p. 12, p. 14) 
• Connectivity. Typically a few gateway switches at ~he DSN 
(located in CONUS, Europe and Pacific) are connected to a 
few major command gateways (AN/TTC-39s) in the AOR. This 
limits the volume of customer access and grade of service. 
During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, over 20 AN/TTC-39s in 
the AOR were directly homed to eight DSN switches. This 
improved the traffic grade of service and conserved on 
transmission resources (transmission from a central hub 
TTC-39 to outlying TTC-39s was eliminated). A valuable 
addition to connectivity was the use of commercial 
satellites links. 
• Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) . This was MSE' s trial by 
fire. Its technical capabilities were proven to perform 
well. 
b. Conceru. 
Successful joint communications interoperability 
was achieved during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The experience 
also revealed some shortcomings. The following is brief 
description of some. (Wentz, Perspectives on C3I Performance 
in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Communications, October 1991, 
p • 121 p o 14) 
27 One can easily become inundated with lessons learned 
from the Persian Gulf War. Three noteworthy documents for 
more information on communications and C3 lessons are Annex 
H to MITRE's Perspectives on C3I Performance in Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm (see reference list under Wentz), 
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, 
Chapters I through VIII and The First Information War by 
Alan Campen. 
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• Connectivity. Although the traffic grade of service was 
improved with the increase in direct TTC-39 to DSN homing, 
traffic engineering of routing over the DSN/tactical 
interface was greatly increased (i.e., the complexity of 
installation and trouble shooting of out of AOR circuits). 
• Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) . Dispersion of forces 
and the pace of battle pushed distances between node 
centers and extension switches beyond equipment (i.e., 
LOS) capabilities. 
• Quality of Service. Regardless of the volume of 
communi cat ions assets employed in the AOR t:1e network 
Grade of Service (GOS) varied from poor (40% GOS) to good 
(>85% GOS). This variation is based on traffic surges, 
balancing and routing. 
• Packet Data. The current tactical links are not designed 
for packet data services. As services C2 migrates to a 
digitally driven common battle picture this short fall 
will increase in criticality. 
In general it can be said that joint networks 
work. However, joint emphasis is required to improve future 
joint networks. As a minimum, gains must be made in traffic 
engineering (e.g., route programming, fault isolation and 
restoral) and upgrading trunk capacity. (Wentz, October 1991, 
p. 14) 
D. RBCAPITULATION 
JTF missions are diverse and require a flexible and 
responsive C2 structure. USPACCOM's study of the transition of 
the Unified Command from a three echelon to two echelon 
command structure appears to be a step in the right direction. 
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However, restructuring alone is not an end to the means. 
Petronius Arbiter, in 210 B.C. stated 
We trained hard ... but it seemed that every time we were 
beginning to form up into a teams we would be reorganized 
... I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any 
new situation by reorganizing: and a wonderful method it 
can be for creating the illusion of progress while 
producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization. 
Restructuring should streamline the C2 but its underpinnings 
must be doctrine. How we fight as a joint force must be 
delineated. Responsibilities must be fixed. Joint doctrine is 
still experiencing growing pains. As it matures nebulous 
concepts will solidify and provide for more effective Service 
interfacing. The completion of the Joint Publications will see 
this to fruition. 28 
In the interim, the U.S. must continue to be prepared to 
respond to global crisis or threat to national security. 
Services must continue to strive for complete communications 
interoperability. TRI-TAC equipment provides a good baseline 
for interoperability but its mutation among the services has 
made connectivity engineering intensive. 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm is a shining example of 
innovative engineering. At the time Desert Storm began the 
network included satellite and terrestrial communications 
28 Some confusion exists in the organization of Joint 
Publications. Specifically in delineation of doctrinal areas 
of responsibility. Example: CE operations is dictated by 
JPUB 6-0 (C4 Systems) however, three C2 publications {JPUB 
3-13 (C2W), JPUB 3-56 (C2 Doctrine), and JPUB 3-56.l{C2 for 
Joint Air Operations) are found under JPUB 3-0 (Operations). 
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links that provided 324 DSN voice trunks and 30 automatic 
digital network (AUTODIN, for record traffic) circuits. At its 
peak, the JCN included 118 GMF satellite terminals, 12 
commercial satellite terminals, 61 TRI-TAC voice and 20 TRI-
TAC message switches. This hybrid system supported more than 
700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Frequency 
management was arduous with more than 35, 000 frequencies 
assigned in theater. The installed system in toto proved to be 
responsive and flexible and was maintained at a 98 percent 




A. AIUIY COJamNICA'l'IONS IN'l'BROPBR.ABILI'l'Y 
Army communications is designed and currently capable of 
both inter-service and combined force (NATO) interoperability. 
At its base level, interoperability is accomplished from the 
tactical Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Node Center 
Switches (hybrid of TRI-TAC switches) through gateways to 
inter-service and combined forces. Three notable areas driving 
the Army's capability to perform communications 
interoperability are C2 architectures, equipment and doctrine. 
1. Commend and Control Architecture• 
The Army's current C2 architecture has evolved from 
the cold war years with the focus being on large forces 
deployed in the European theater. This architecture is called 
the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) . The 
basic building blocks of Army core communications in support 
of ATCCS are Combat Net Radio (CNR), the Army Data 
Distribution System (ADDS) and the Area Common User System 
(ACUS) . Providing the services of these basic blocks is a 
constant. There will always be a need to provide the 
functionality of the three. However, as the National Military 
Strategy evolves so will the systematic implementation of 
these functions. Technological advances and the increasing 
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reliance on digital data transmissions is driving the Army to 
revise its C3 system. The "Enterprise Strategy" is the Army's 
view of the future C3 system. Its impact on the future C2 
architecture remains to be seen. Smaller, faster and more 
lethal forces will require an architecture that is responsive, 
light and flexible. 
Within the Unified Command the Army's component 
relationship in support of JTF operations is also in flux. 
Under the Unified Command's three tier C2 architecture, 
service components respond to directives from the CINC in 
support of the Subunified Commander who had operational 
control of the CJTF. The two tier approach has streamlined C2. 
Under this scheme the components provide forces and support 
directly to the CJTF as directed by the CINC. Thus far Pacific 
Command is the only Unified Command avidly pursuing a C2 
transition from three tier to two. (Joint Task Forces, 8 
December 1993, p. 4) 
2. COIIIIINDicationa Bquipment 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved that the Army's 
communication equipment is successful in the joint 
interoperability arena. Inter-service gateway access is 
accomplished from the Army MSE system via the AN/TTC-39 (voice 
traffic) and AN/TYC-39 (record traffic) . Both are proven TRI-
TAC switches and have been fielded to the Army, Air Force and 
Marines. NATO interface at the tactical level is accomplished 
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using the NATO Analog Interface (NAI) converter installed at 
the MSE NC or interfaced using a line of sight (LOS) V2 
assemblage. The success of the Joint Communications Network 
(JCN), although tenuous (see Chapter IV, Section C) during 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm is proof of inter-service 
communications interoperability. 
Although the C2 system and supporting communications 
network was successful the question that perhaps should be 
asked is "Was the communications system effective?" 
Communications effectiveness in toto is the subject for 
another thesis. 
An analogy for general communications effectiveness 
can be gleaned from the success of C2 in the joint air war. 
Despite progress made toward jointness prior to the Persian 
Gulf War, the U.S. is said to have "bought" its way out of 
command and control problems by massing its tactical air 
forces. It has been stated that the U.S. fought big but not 
smart. 29 The same can be said for the theater C3 system. 
Assets were pumped into the theater to bolster organic 
assemblages, and numerous commercial assets were exploited. 30 
Although the Army communication equipment was 
"successful• in Desert Shield/Desert Storm four shortfalls are 
29 Winnefeld, 1993, p. 126. 
30 Twelve addition MSE Node Centers were provided to 
the theater by III and V Corps. More than a dozen commercial 
satellite local and long-distance carriers participated in 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 
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of note. First, MSE long haul line of sight (LOS) equipment 
could not cover the distance of dispersed forces. Secondly, 
cessation, movement and re-establishment of node centers could 
not keep pace with the forces. Organic assets were not 
adequate. For MSE equipped divisions additional node centers 
were OPCONed to support a "leap frog" scheme of maneuver. TRI-
TAC Pulse Coded Modulation (PCM, tactical communications 
equipment prior to MSE) equipped divisions conducted 
controlled substitution programs to build additional switching 
centers to enable "leap frog" operations. Thirdly, engineering 
circuits through differing switches is time intensive. 31 This 
engineering burden will continue to recede as the separate 
services migrate toward like switching systems. 32 Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, was the tenuous ability to 
effectively transmit record data. 33 
Tactical communications are geared to the warfighter 
who, in the past, has exclusively used voice, telephone and 
courier to conduct battle operations and planning. 
31 See Chapter IV, Section C, 3, b. 
32 The Honorable Mr Emmett Paige, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for C3I stated in a letter to SECMILDEPs, 
ASSTSECDEF (SO & LIC), DIRDISA, DIRDIA, DIRNSA, and DIRJTSTF 
dated 26 November 1993 that " ... interoperability among 
switched systems within DoD is paramount." It goes on to say 
"The Joint Staff will validate requirements to ensure that 
they include necessary functionality for the equipment to 
operate in a joint network". 
33 For an in-depth discussion on Packet Switched 
Networks see The First Information War by Alan Campen pp. 
109-119. 
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Technological advances have enabled, and the rapidity of 
battle has forced, commanders to enhance their ability to 
quickly disseminate battlefield information. Computer systems 
have been developed to support the commander in this endeavor 
(e.g., Desert Shield/Desert Storm saw the utilization of the 
Army Central Forces C2 Information System (AC2ISl l. Data 
generated by these computer systems must be packetized for 
transmission over the tactical communications system. In 
support of digital data transmission the Army is fielding a 
Packet Switched Network ( PSN) which will operate over the 
existing MSE backbone system. Future operations will require 
a digitized common view of the battlefield. All-source fusion 
to support a common view is data intensive. PSN is the key to 
enabling the distribution of this data. 
3 • Doctrine 
Many problems with joint communications inter-
operability stem from the historical disconcerted approach to 
joint doctrine. 34 A refocusing on the joint task force and 
force projection in recent times in conjunction with joint 
exercises has enabled the identification and rectification of 
many interoperability concerns. An emphasis on joint 
operations and exercises alone will not systemically rectify 
34 A discussion on the evolution of joint operations 
can be found in Command and Control of Theater Forces: The 
Future of Force Projection Operations by John Cushman (June 
1991, pp. 27-48) 
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all communications interoperability woes. Joint doctrine is 
the congealing factor to successful communications. Current 
joint doctrine publications are altruistic yet enigmatic. The 
Joint Publications System is functioning and correcting these 
deficiencies. However, in light of recent historic changes and 
technological advancements will Joint Doctrine be overcome by 
events? Regardless of the status of joint publications at the 
time of the next crisis the JTF J6 will establish a Joint 
Communications Network {JCN) and it will work. A 
communications template and responsibilities may be vague but 
the functionality is understood by system engineers and will 
be executed. Innovative engineering worked during Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm and will work in the future. The intent of 
producing succinct doctrine documentation is to enable 
communications engineers to work in an efficient and timely 
manner. 
B. 
Future operations will continue to be fraught with diverse 
situations requiring rapid response. The ability to provide 
communications will be based on acquisition and doctrine 
decisions made years beforehand. The TRI-TAC program provided 
a good base for the Army's leap to MSE. MSE's flood search, 
fixed subscriber number and packet switching capability appear 
to provide a well grounded base for the next evolution. The 
communications system of the future must be versatile enough 
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to support either Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) or High 
Intensity Conflict (HIC) . It must be lightweight to accompany 
small, fast moving forces. Above all else it must be one 
synergistic system capable of supporting voice, data and 
information fusion. Austere force levels dictate that a force 
be effective. First strike kills are a must. To effectively 
execute a strike a commander must know the enemy composition 
and disposition. Sensor support systems must be capable of 
timely acquisition, tracking and dissemination. Timely 
dissemination to warfighters requires availability of 
transmission equipment and bandwidth. It is no surprise that 
there is an increasing propensity toward the use of satellites 
in fulfilling long haul transmission routes. This trend is a 
phenomenon that has been documented by J6Z. 
Many requestors of satellite support do not understand the 
transmission throughput of data and the power required to 
transmit that data. Figure 26 is a relational depiction of 











The volume of information transmitted by CNN is apparent 
(i.e., 90 Mbps). Also depicted are the T3, T1 {typical 
telephone trunk circuits) and the standard 58 kbps rate for a 
Data Switched Network (DSNET) . Of particular note is the 
current shipboard bandwidth allocation for intelligence (only 
4.8 kbps) . 35 To accommodate the volumes of data required for 
information synergism the shipboard pipe must be larger. 
Increasing shipboard pipe size is difficult. Part of this 
problem is driven by the nature of seaborne vessels. 
Seaborne vessels do not provide an optimum platform for 
satellite communications. Limited deck space restricts the 
size of satellite dishes, and craft roll and pitch reduce the 
Gain per noise Temperature (G/T) . A stable large satellite 
dish provides for optimum reception of the satellite signal. 
A comparison of bandwidth capability given the same power 
output of the satellite, ground dish size, employment (Navy, 
Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) and Medium/Heavy Terminals (M/T, 
H/T)) and G/T is depicted in Figure 27. (Woodward, 18 April 
1994) 
35 From Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
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1. &yat .. Perfo~• 
The performance of the future system must be capable 
of providing an all source synergistic view of the 
battlefield. Digitization of the battle field is underway now. 
To support this endeavor current communications shortfalls 
must be overcome. These include automating the Communications 
Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI, or Signal Operating 
Instruction (SOI)), improving systems engineering management 
(e.g., frequency deconfliction, communications routing, etc.} , 
reduction in unique software, increasing availability of long 
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haul assets and effective use of bandwidth. 36 Above all the 
system must be interoperable. 
2. service Concept• 
The Department of Defense and the services have 
recognized a need for an evolution in the C3 arena. Innovative 
approaches to effectively employ technological advances is 
paramount. The Defense Wide view of this new system is called 
C4I For The Warrior (C4IFTW). The objective of C4IFTW is to: 
... ensure that all C4I systems in the future be planned, 
acquired, configured, and integrated appropriately to meet 
the full spectrum of Joint warfighting needs, and that the 
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), Services, and DOD agencies 
pursue a common, coo~dinated, and integratf!d C4I systems 
migration strategy and roadmap to achieve C4I for the 
Warrior (C4IFTW) goals. 37 
The goal of C4IF'IW is to provide a unified strat.~gy 
for the orderly migration from current C4I systems to a fully 
integrated and interoperable worldwide system. The Army is 
supporting this migration via its Enterprise Stra~egy (see 
Chapter II, Section B, subsection 5). The other Services have 
36 In the Marine Corps Briefing to the Military 
Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) on The Marine Corps 
Migration Strategy to the GCCS Core Services, it was stated 
that over 70 percent of the code is in Computer Software 
Configuration Items covering nine areas (from mapping/ 
overlays to system administration)- "each system elected to 
'build its own'". (p. 10) 
37 From the Joint Mission Needs Statement (JMNS) for 
Achieving the C4I for the Warrior Concept (Coordinated 
Draft) , p. 1 . 
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also begun their migration. The Air Force's concept is called 
•Horizon•. The Navy's is NCopernicus". 38 
3. su-zy 
This thesis provides a synoptic view of the Army 
structure, C2 architecture, communications equipment, its role 
in the JTF and JCN responsibilities. Its intent is to provide 
a perspective on the Army baseline structure, systems and 
interoperability. Recent changes in the world have placed the 
United States at a historic crossroad. The National Military 
Strategy is shifting from a global and theater level warfare 
perspective to one focused on spontaneous regic1al and crisis 
operations. In the face of reducing force levels, 
technological advances, increasing costs and weapons 
lethality, commanders must exploit all means available. 
Communications is an edge that, when used effectively, can 
provide a commander a force multiplier. This thesis provides 
insights into the Army's foundation systems from which their 
future C4I will evolve. The Army's ability to support the 
National Military Strategy and execute future missions will be 
a direct function of its C4I capabilities. 
38 For further information on separate Service C4I 
migration see: Horizon, Air Force C4I Strategy for the 21st 
Centu~; Moving Na~ Communications into the 21st Centu~ 
and Copernicus Functional Description Document (FDD). 
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C. Sc.a.RIO 
Reference Chapter I, Section D. This is a scenario based 
view of a future Army C4I system. 
1. C~icaticm. Bquipaent 
The Army Tactical C2 Airborne Platform (ATC2AP, fixed 
wing) is equipped for C3 and all source analysis of 
intelligence inputs. This integration includes information 
from data bases and sensors (National Technical Means, AWACS, 
JSTARS, etc.). Four similarly equipped command helicopters 
exist in the division. One is for the Strike Team Staff (G3, 
Operations) and one each per brigade. The helicopters are not 
capable of all source analysis but can take targeting feeds 
from sensors and the ATC2AP. 
Additionally, al~ aircraft and vehicles have Area of 
Influence Plasma Sc~een Displays (AOIPSD). AOIPSD's are 
artificial intelligence driven graphic displays of all enemy 
and friendly forces within "influencing• range (different for 
each platform) . Targeting information and priorities can be 
received from the ATC2AP or helicopter command aircraft. 
2. The lli••ion 1JDfol48 
The Strike Force Commander (SFC) is en route to East 
Calmorn and begins to receive intelligence downlink 
information. Airports have been secured and the aviation 
brigade has established bases of operation at them. 
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Penetration of the border occurs as the SFC aircraft 
enters East Calmorn airspace. · :elligence feeds to the ATC2AP 
provide enemy locations and c ~osition. These appear on the 
SFC's command console (similar to a Naval Tactical Display 
System (NTDS) with terrain). 
The armor brigade has not completed equipment receipt. 
The SFC must hit the enemy quickly and hard. The aviation 
brigade is scrambled. T~ geting will occur on the move. 
The aviation brigade is deployed with scouts forward, 
heavily armed helicopters follow with the brigade command 
helicopter in trail. The SFC gives his priorities for strikes 
to the G3 helicopter and the aviation brigade commander. 
The aviation brigade engages the enemy. Automatic 
sensor feeds to the helicopters continue during the battle. 
Engagements are monitored by the SFC and G3 as the aviation 
brigade fights the battle. The enemy advance is neutralized, 
their remaining forces withdraw. 
3. Recapitulation 
Although the above scenario is fictitious, some 
aspects may come to fruition in the near future. JSTARS' 
ability to deliver data to a helicopter has already been 
demonstrated. A continuing theme throughout this thesis has 
been the Army's move toward improving its ability to transmit 
intelligence over existing networks and equipment. Mobile 
Subscriber Equipment (MSE), Single Channel Ground and Airborne 
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Radio System (SINCGARS) and the Enhanced Position Location 
Reporting System (EPLRS) are just some of the base elements of 
the Army's C3 system. A view of the digital battlefield will 
be transmitted over these or like hybrid systems. When linked 
to satellite and sensor systems it will be capable of 
supporting the functionality demonstrated in the above 
scenario. What the Army needs to do is examine its force 
structure, training and doctrine in light of these advances. 
(Journal of Electronic Defense, January 1994, pp. 36-37) 
While current inter-service communication is 
successful it must become efficient in anticipation of an 
increased traffic load. Cyrus the Great, founder of the 
Persian Empire had inscribed on his palace wall: "Mene Mene 
Tekel Upharsin," which translates to "Thou Art Weighed in the 
Balance and Found Wanting." 39 War is unforgiving. Warriors, 
like doctors, bury their mistakes. The warrior is increasingly 
reliant on electronic C3I systems in the prosecution of 
battle. When the Joint Communications System of the future is 
"weighed in the balance" it must be capable of rising to the 
task. 
























APPID1DIX A. ACRORYIIS 
Area Air Defense Commander 
Armored Cavalry Regiment 
Area Common User System 
Air Defense Artillery 
Army Data Distribution System 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
Air Force Forces 
Air Force Special Operations Base 
Adjutant General 
Amplitude Modulated 
Armored Personnel Carrier 
Armor 
Army Forces 
All Source Analysis System 
Army Tactical Command and Control System 
Automatic Data Network 
Automatic Voice Network 
Aviation 
Battlefield Automated System 
Battlefield Functional Area 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle 




























Close Air Support 
Communications and Electronics 
Commander in Chief 
Combat Network Radio 
Commander Army Forces 
Commander Air Force Forces 
Commander Joint Special Operations Task Force 
Commander Land Forces 
Commander Marine Forces 
Commander Navy Forces 
Communications Security 
Continental United States 
Corp Support Command 
Command Post 
Control and Reporting Center 
Call Service Position 
Combat Support 
Combat Service Support 
Command and Control 
Command, Control and Intelligence 
Command, Control and Communications 
Command, Control, Communications and Computers 
Defense Communications System 
Direction Finding 
Defense Information Systems Agency 





























Digital NATO Interface 
Digital Non-Secure Voice Terminal 
Direct Support 
Defense Satellite Communications System 
Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal 
Echelons Above Corps 
Electronic Counter Measures 
Emissions Control 
Engineers 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 
Field Artillery 
Forward Area Air Defense System 




Forward Support Battalion 
Fleet Telecommunications Operating Procedures 
Ground Mobile Forces 
General Telephone and Electronics 
High Frequency 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company 
High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 
Headquarters 
Intelligence/Electronic Warfare 




























Installed, Operated and Maintained 
Intermediate Staging Base 
Joint Communications Control Center 
Joint Communications Support Element 
Joint Intelligence Center 
Joint Operational Area 
Joint Tactical Air Operations 
Joint Task Force 
Joint Special Operations Task Force 
Kilowatt 
Local Area Network 
Large Extension Node 
Large Extension Node Switch 
Line of Sight 
Low Rate Initial Production 
Marine Forces 
Marine Expeditionary Unit 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
Mobile Subscriber Radiotelephone Terminal 
NATO Analog Interface 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Navy Forces 
National Command Authority 
Node Center Switch 
Node Management Facility 




























Navy Special Warfare Task Group 
Pulse Coded Modulation 
Quartermaster 
Radio Access Unit 
Reseau Integre de Transmissions Automatique 
Remote Multiplexer Combiner 
Range Extension 
Remote Radio Access Unit 
Radio to Wire Interface 
Satellite Communications 
System Control Center 
Small Extension Node 
Special Forces 
Super High Frequency 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
Standardization Agreement 
System Control 
Tactical Command Post 
Tactical Air Control Center 
Tactical Air Control Party 
Tactical Satellite 
Technical Manual 
Tactical Operation Center 
Table of Organization and Equipment 
Tropospheric 





Wide Area Network 
Wing Operations Center 
Very High Frequency 
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APPBRDIX B. SYMBOLOGY 
I 
I 
SYMBOL DESCRIPTION ABBREVIAnoN I 
00 Section or Squad SEC,SQD I I 
000 Platlon or Detachment PLT,DET 
I Company, Battery or CO, BAT, TRP Troop 
I I Battalion or Squadron BN,SQDRN 
I I I Group or Regiment GRP, REG 
X Brigade or Equlvalant BDE 
XX Division DIV 
XXX Corps CRP 
~ Infantry INF 
ICJI Armor AR 
0 Recon or Cavalry RECON,CAV 
rn Engineer ENG 
0 Artillery ARTY 
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SYIIBOL DESCRIP'nON ABBREVIATION I 
Medical MED 
I) cl Malntenanc:e MNT 
. 
lt><JI Aviation AV 
lt>t<J I Avaitlon (Rotary) 
IC>t<J I Attack HelicOpter 
I o;x\D I NBC NBC 
~~ AJr Defense Artillery ADA 
~ Mechanized Infantry MECH INF 
~I Armored Recon (CAV) ARC 
ICDI Armored Artillery (Self AARTY (SP) Propelled) 
1~1 SlgnaliCommo SIG 
I @ I Transportation TRANS 
IPI Paychologlcal PSYOPS Operations 
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I SYMBOL 
I CA I 
I PERS I 
1/~1 I I 








CMIIan Affairs CA 
Personnel PERS 
Finance 
Adjutant General AG 
: Ill Corps 
: 101h Infantry Division, Ill Corps 
: 1st Brigade (Armor). 101h lnf Div. Ill Corps 
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